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Abstract
Natural wealth is generally considered as one of the fundamental sources of economic growth. However, a vast majority of the related 
empirical research verified that resource-rich countries tend to underperform their resource-deficient counterparts. This paradox is 
known as the resource curse. During the past two decades more sophisticated analyses have revealed that the presence of the curse 
is conditional and its growth effects are non-monotonic. Recent efforts concentrate on understanding the transmission channels and 
identifying the decisive conditions on the fulfillment of the curse. This article gives an overview on the progress and depicts the current 
state of the research.
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1 Introduction
Sachs and Warner (1995) presented the first empirical ev-
idence on the resource curse as a result of a cross-country 
OLS-regression analysis of per capita economic growth. 
They showed that resource intensity – if measured as the 
share of unprocessed commodities within exports – re-
lated negatively to growth rates between 1970 and 1989. 
Since then their results proved to be robust at the level of 
the broad concept, and have been verified several times 
using either pure, statistical, or scientific replication. 
(Davis, 2013) Academic interest is still on the rise as re-
cent events like the Arab Spring or the crisis in Venezuela 
are principally explained in the context of the resource 
curse. (Papyrakis, 2016)
First attempts of theoretical understanding were based 
on the Dutch disease model originally developed by 
Corden and Neary (1982), in which the resource-driv-
en growth generates losses in international competitive-
ness and leads to a less diverse and vulnerable economy. 
In this framework the booming extractive sector distracts 
resources from manufacturing and boosts the demand for 
domestic services causing direct and indirect de-indus-
trialization. Windfalls from resource-exports induce the 
Balassa–Samuelson-effect and the subsequent real ap-
preciation clogs the development in other tradable sec-
tors. Moreover, the manufacturing-related positive exter-
nalities lag behind as infant industries fail to achieve the 
economies of scale. This uneven development exposes the 
country to the volatility of international commodity prices 
and exerts adverse effects on economic growth. (van der 
Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009)
However, the Dutch disease theory implies a mono-
tone negative growth effect of resource abundance, which 
seems to contradict the empirical evidences. (Boschini et 
al., 2007) Countries like Norway, Australia, or Chile have 
developed a significant resource sector and yet they are reg-
ularly listed among the top economic performers. Recent 
research revealed that the resource curse is a more diverse 
phenomenon which has widespread effects on economic, 
social, and political development. (Ross, 2015) This paper 
aims to overview these results, map the relations between 
them, and show the current state of the progress. It is orga-
nized into six sections: Section 2 outlines the main results 
from the past two decades, while Section 3 discusses the 
possible transmission channels and a few illustrative em-
pirical findings on recent datasets. Section 4 is about the 
political economy of the curse and Section 5 is dedicated 
to the open questions. Section 6 concludes and gives an 
overview on the policy proposals.
2 Evolution of the literature
Earlier contributions to the Dutch disease (van Wijnbergen, 
1984; Yokoyama, 1989; Matsuyama, 1992) have created a 
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plausible platform for the theoretical research. Auty and 
Warhurst – who have introduced and popularized the term 
resource curse – argued that the Dutch disease leads to 
resource-dependency and weak economic performance, 
which threaten welfare and environmental policy goals as 
well. The development becomes unsustainable as non-re-
source sectors lose competitiveness and require subsidies 
from extraction. Consequently, the effects of a mineral 
downswing are rapid and disastrous. (Auty and Warhurst, 
1993) Recovery is protracted, since all forms of capital 
tend to run down during the subsequent growth collapse, 
including physical, human, and social capital as well. 
(Auty, 2001) Sachs and Warner (1997a; 1999) also iden-
tified the Dutch disease as the main transmission chan-
nel and emphasised the importance of open trade policies. 
Table 1 shows a replication of their cross-country OLS-
model which verified the significant negative link between 
resource intensity and economic growth while indicated 
the positive effects of open trade policies as well. 
The essence of all the Dutch disease theories is the 
crowding-out logic, that is, natural resources crowd 
out activities which drive economic growth. (Sachs and 
Warner, 2001) In the most model variants extraction caus-
es the shrinking of manufacturing (Auty, 1998a), a sec-
tor which is assumed to generate positive external effects 
via learning-by-doing and technology diffusion. In the 
Ricardian view, the comparative advantage in the resource 
sector induces export specialization in low-tech extraction 
(Lee, 2011) and pushes the country onto a less favourable 
long-term growth path. Papyrakis demonstrated how nat-
ural wealth lowers efforts on research and development. 
(Papyrakis, 2011) Moreover, the crowding-out logic seems 
to be consistent with the patterns of capital accumulation 
and foreign direct investments. (Gylfason, 2001b)
Many studies claim that resource abundant countries 
tend to have low or negative genuine savings rate. (van 
der Ploeg, 2010) Gylfason (2001b) found several indices 
of educational quality to be related negatively with nat-
ural wealth, whereas England (2000) suggests a general 
complementarity in the production of natural and other 
forms of capital. Consequently, abundant economies are 
likely to develop resource-intensive structures with a rel-
ative low level of human capital, which causes them to lag 
behind the technology frontier. The ineffective extraction 
raises economic and environmental concerns alike, since 
most of the productive activity is based on the exploita-
tion of natural wealth. The less the resource product is 
processed, the stronger are the adverse effects. (Murshed 
Table 1 Author’s replication of the Sachs & Warner OLS-model on 
economic growth. SW1997 refers to regression 1.5 in Table I., Sachs and 
Warner (1997a), t-statistics are in parentheses. Minor differences in the 
result may arise from the different versions of the datasets (n=71 vs. 74).
Data source: Center for International Development, Harvard University, 
available at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/cid
Dependent variable (gea7090)
Average annual growth of GDP per economically active population
(PPP, 1970–1990)
Regressors / Indicators SW1997 Replication
lgdpea70
Natural log of GDP per economically 
active population (1970)
–1.79
(–8.22)
–1.80
(–8.21)
sxp
Share of primary exports in GNP 
(1970)
–10.26
(–6.89)
–8.28
(–6.67)
sopen
Fraction of years the country is rated as 
an open economy (1970–1990)
1.34
(3.44)
1.57
(3.96)
linv7089
Natural log of the average investment 
rate (1970–1989)
0.81
(2.63)
0.84
(2.67)
rl
Rule of law index (1982)
0.40
(3.94)
0.40
(3.84)
dtt7090
Average annual growth in the log of 
external terms of trade (1970–1990)
0.09
(1.85)
0.11
(2.43)
Sample size 71 74
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.75
Standard error 0.92 0.97
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Fig. 1 Correlation of resource intensity and economic growth as in 
the original 1997 Sachs and Warner dataset. Data source: Center for 
International Development, Harvard University, available at: 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/cid
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and Serino, 2011) Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) suggest 
that countries with lower genuine savings rate experience 
slower economic growth and lower levels of sustainable 
consumption. Another branch of the literature emphasis-
es the long-term effects of resource-driven specialization. 
Drelichman (2005) argues that Spain’s economic stagna-
tion in the seventeenth century was due to the resource 
curse induced by precious metals from the newly con-
quered American mines, while Etkind (2011) put the curse 
into a historical perspective as he stated that the boom and 
depletion of the Siberian fur trade have shaped the Russian 
development just as fossil resources do today. 
Nonetheless, the crowding-out logic itself was unable to 
resolve the monotony problem and explain the differences 
in cross-country growth experiences. Torvik (2001) and 
others have extended the Dutch disease framework with 
learning-by-doing effects in the non-tradable sector and 
analysed the optimal management of the resource wealth 
in a normative setting. (Matsen and Torvik, 2005) They 
showed that the presence of the curse is conditional upon 
the assumptions on the direct and indirect learning effects. 
But in spite of their advances, academic interest began to 
trend towards the more promising political economy ex-
planations. (Saad-Filho and Weeks, 2013)
Kolstad and Wiig (2009a) distinguish two categories; 
the centralized and decentralized models of political econ-
omy. Both suggest that the resource curse is conditional on 
the institutional quality, but centralized models consider 
the decisions of the political elite, while decentralized ex-
planations focus on the actions of individual entrepreneurs. 
Several studies found the resource curse to disappear under 
strong institutions (Mehlum et al., 2006a; Apergis and Payne 
2014; Bhattacharyya and Collier 2014; Sarmidi et al., 2014) 
and concluded that abundance may even foster economic 
growth. (Szalai, 2011; Boschini et al., 2013) Hence, political 
economy models are plausible candidates to resolve the mo-
notony problem. See Section 4 for further discussion.
However, empirical research revealed that the adverse 
effects are likely to be dependent on other conditions as 
well. Geographical factors seem to play a significant role 
as many found that point-source resources – like precious 
metals, gemstones, crude oil, natural gas, or plantations – 
are more prone to the curse than diffused ones. (Isham et 
al., 2005; Wick and Bulte, 2006) The appropriability hy-
pothesis emphasises the interaction between the physical 
characteristics of the resource and the institutional envi-
ronment of the country where its extraction takes place. 
Technically more appropriable resources are in general 
easier to trade or smuggle, they need less processing, and 
have high value-to-mass ratio. The hypothesis states that 
the curse occurs when appropriable resources couple with 
weak institutions. (Boschini et al., 2007) Andersen and 
Aslaksen (2008) suggest a linkage between the growth ef-
fects and the country’s constitutional arrangement as they 
claim that the resource curse exists in democratic pres-
idential countries but not in parliamentary democracies. 
They also found this difference to be more significant than 
being democratic or autocratic.
3 Transmission channels
Classic theories of economic growth consider natural 
wealth as a productive asset. Hence, resource abundant 
countries shall have larger stock of initial capital and better 
development prospects. However, regarding the aggregate 
growth effects this concept seems to contradict most of 
the empirical evidences. To address the paradox Gylfason 
(2006) identified five intermediate mechanisms which 
may transmit the curse. All five channels act through the 
crowding-out logic in terms of the components of capital.
The first one follows directly from the Dutch disease as 
the loss in international competitiveness distracts foreign in-
vestors. Thus, natural wealth crowds-out foreign capital by 
cutting inward FDI-flows. The second channel concerns rent 
seeking and income inequality. Carmignani (2013) showed 
that rents from the extractive sector increase inequality, and 
higher inequality lowers the average level of human devel-
opment. In this sense, natural resources tend to crowd-out 
social capital. The third transmission mechanism arises from 
the relative high level of non-wage incomes in resource-driv-
en economies. Windfalls lower the excess returns on skilled 
labour which generate less incentive to invest in education. 
That is, natural wealth crowds-out human capital. The fourth 
channel concerns the effectiveness of domestic investments. 
Resource-deficiency places a premium on allocative effi-
ciency, whereas abundance creates white elephants which 
have more to do with symbolism than with productivity. 
Robinson and Torvik (2005) developed a formal model to 
explain how political incentives drive the misallocation. 
Consequently, natural wealth crowds-out the productive seg-
ments of physical capital. The fifth mechanism suggest that 
resource revenues deteriorate financial markets and interme-
diaries by causing insufficient contract enforcement. (Bhat-
tacharyya and Hodler, 2014) Therefore, the crowding-out 
logic seems to apply for financial capital as well. 
The resource curse may be consistent with the classic 
growth theories if indirect effects are properly considered. 
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Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) showed that resource 
abundance does exert positive direct impacts, but nega-
tive indirect effects outweigh them by a reasonable order 
of magnitude. Following Sachs and Warner they adopt-
ed the conditional convergence hypothesis and explained 
cross-country growth differences in terms of resource in-
tensity. This basic regression verified the negative aggre-
gate effect of resource abundance. Then they extended the 
model with additional explanatory variables inspired by 
earlier empirical studies on economic growth. (Sachs and 
Warner 1997a; Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Mo, 2001) Resource 
intensity turned out to be less significant after controlling 
for possible indirect channels, while the change in the 
sign of its coefficient revealed the positive direct impact. 
Moreover, Papyrakis and Gerlagh were able to calculate 
estimations for the importance of each transmission chan-
nel as their relative contribution to the aggregate.
According to them the most significant negative in-
direct effect evolves through the international channel, 
which counts for 42% of total contributions. This mecha-
nism is principally associated with the Dutch disease, be-
cause it reflects the effects of extraction on the country’s 
trade openness and external terms of trade. The invest-
ment channel has a slightly smaller relative importance 
with 41%, and acts similar to Gylfason’s first and fourth 
channel. An additional argument is that resource revenues 
create a false sense of security in the private and public 
sector alike, which generates less incentive to invest but 
more to take risk. (Gylfason and Zoega, 2006) The edu-
cation channel – or schooling channel as Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh refer to it – weighs for 11% and transmits the 
crowding-out of skilled labour and human capital just 
as Gylfason’s third mechanism does. The proxy for this 
channel was the average secondary enrolment rate be-
tween 1970 and 1989. Fig. 4 shows a similar correlation 
on more recent data indicating a negative relation between 
resource intensity – now measured as ratio of rents to GDP 
– and secondary schooling. Lastly, the corruption trans-
mission channel turned out to be the least significant with 
6% of relative importance. Resource abundance is likely 
to increase corruption (Vicente 2010; Brollo et al., 2013), 
but this effect is conditional on the institutional quality. 
(Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010) While perceived cor-
ruption may resemble a component of Gylfason’s second 
channel, Wadho (2014) argues that the effects of education 
and corruption are transmitted jointly.
Van der Ploeg (2011) suggests eight plausible interme-
diate mechanisms which can be summarized as follows: 
(i) Dutch disease, (ii) learning-by-doing, (iii) institutions, 
(iv) constitutional arrangement, (v) corruption, (vi) volatil-
ity, (vii) rent seeking, and (viii) unsustainable public pol-
icies. Most of them overlap with the channels discussed 
above, but the role of institutions is somewhat unique. 
Strong empirical evidence supports that good institutional 
quality can turn the curse into a blessing. The possibility 
of transforming the adverse effects of resource abundance 
does not associate to any other channel. Hence, the insti-
tutional approach may resolve the monotony problem and 
explain outliers like Norway. (Larsen, 2006) Theories of 
political economy offer several methods to demonstrate 
how institutions affect resource-driven economies. Bulte 
and co-authors showed that not just economic growth, but 
many other measures of human development are condi-
tional on the institutional quality. (Bulte et al., 2005)
4 Political economy of the curse
Some early studies already recognized that differences 
in governmental economic policies are more pronounced 
in case of resource abundance. (Auty, 1997; 1998b) The 
state-centered explanations of the curse argue that abundant 
countries are likely to develop into rentier states (Ross, 
1999), where politicians engage in rent-seeking and patron-
age which induce poor economic governance, investment 
misallocation, and ineffective public employment. In this 
framework the adverse growth effects are conditional on 
the institutional quality of the public sector. (Kolstad, 2009)
Robinson and co-authors developed a formal two-pe-
riod model of clientelism which features an election at 
the end of the first period with a politician wishing to 
Natural capital 
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Social  capital 
Human capital 
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Financial 
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Economic 
growth 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Fig. 2 Natural wealth crowds-out other capital components
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be re-elected, an alternative candidate, and a unit mass 
of voters. (Robinson et al., 2006; 2014) The public insti-
tutional quality is captured through the ability of the in-
cumbent to affect the elections by hiring ineffective pub-
lic employees. Put differently, it means that under weak 
institutions the incumbent can buy votes for wages. The 
model was designed to demonstrate the key results of the 
centralized theories of political economy. Firstly, politi-
cians tend to over-extract natural resources relative to 
the socially optimal path, because they discount the fu-
ture with the probability of being re-elected. Secondly, a 
resource boom improves the efficiency of the extraction 
path, but increases resource misallocation in the rest of the 
economy. And thirdly, the overall growth impact depends 
critically on the political institutions. If the incumbent has 
small chance to influence the elections, then the expected 
returns on clientelism are low. Hence, under strong insti-
tutions the incumbent is interested in an economically ef-
ficient allocation. The model concludes that natural wealth 
impedes growth only if public institutions are weak.
The de-centralized models focus on the actions of indi-
viduals or groups outside the political elite (Torvik, 2002; 
Mehlum et al., 2003; Hodler 2006) and thus on institutions 
governing the private sector. (Mehlum et al., 2006b) In this 
framework entrepreneurs choose to allocate efforts wheth-
er to productive or rent-seeking activities based on their 
relative profitability. According to the model by Mehlum 
and co-authors the productive sector features positive de-
mand externalities and increasing returns to scale, where-
as the low-tech resource sector creates opportunities for 
rent-seeking – or grabbing as they refer to it. A commod-
ity boom induces a positive income effect in the resource 
sector but it generates a negative displacement effect in 
the production as well. The overall impact is conditional 
on the quality of institutions protecting property rights, 
which gives two equilibria for the model. In the producer 
equilibrium all entrepreneurs are producers and resource 
rents are a blessing for the economy, whereas in the grab-
ber equilibrium the displacement effect dominates, and re-
sources turn into a curse. De-centralized models describe 
the microeconomic foundations of the phenomenon.
Another significant body of research suggest that 
institutions are endogenous to resource endowment. 
Wiens (2014) created a game theory model to show how 
weak institutions induce the resource curse, which in 
turn clogs the institutional development. He concludes 
that the adverse effects are conditional on the quality 
of institutions prior to the windfalls from extraction. 
International resource revenues make the political elite 
largely independent from the citizens which reduces the 
demand for democratic accountability (McGuirk, 2013), 
whereas reliance on taxes improves institutional quality as 
an essential factor in state-building. Case studies involving 
Kazakhstan, Russia (Weinthal and Jones Luong, 2001), 
and Nigeria (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2013) found 
The resource curse may be consistent with the classic growth 
theories if indirect effects are properly considered. Papyrakis 
and Gerlagh (2004) showed that resource abundance does exert 
positive direct impacts, but negative indirect effects outweigh 
them by a reasonable order of magnitude. Following Sachs and 
Warner they adopted the conditional convergence hypothesis 
and explained cross-country growth differences in terms of 
resource intensity. This basic regression verified the negative 
aggregate effect of resource abundance. Then they extended the 
model with additional explanatory variables inspired by earlier 
empirical studies on economic growth. (Sachs & Warner 1997a, 
Sala-i-Martin 1997, Mo 2001) Resource intensity turned out to 
be less significant after controlling for possible indirect 
channels, while the change in the sign of its coefficient revealed 
the positive direct impact. Moreover, Papyrakis and Gerlagh 
were able to calculate estimations for the importance of each 
transmission channel as their relative contribution to the 
aggregate. 
According to them the most significant negative indirect 
effect evolves through the international channel, which counts 
for 42% of total contributions. This mechanism is principally 
associated with the Dutch disease, because it reflects the effects 
of extraction on the country’s trade openness and external terms 
of trade. The investment channel has a slightly smaller relative 
importance with 41%, and acts similar to Gylfason’s first and 
fourth channel. An additional argument is that resource 
revenues create a false sense of security in the private and public 
sector alike, which generates less incentive to invest but more 
to take risk. (Gylfason & Zoega 2006) The education channel – 
or schooling channel as Papyrakis and Gerlagh refer to it – 
weighs for 11% and transmits the crowding-out of skilled labour 
and human capital just as Gylfason’s third mechanism does. The 
proxy for this channel was the average secondary enrolment rate 
between 1970 and 1989. Fig. 3 shows a similar correlation on 
more recent data indicating a negative relation between resource 
intensity – now measured as ratio of rents to GDP – and 
secondary schooling. Lastly, the corruption transmission 
channel turned out to be the least significant with 6% of relative 
importance. Resource abundance is likely to increase corruption 
(Vicente 2010, Brollo et al. 2013), but this effect is conditional 
on the institutional quality. (Bhattacharyya & Hodler 2010) 
While perceived corruption may resemble a component of 
Gylfason’s second channel, Wadho (2014) argues that the 
effects of education and corruption are transmitted jointly.  
Van der Ploeg (2011) suggests eight plausible intermediate 
mechanisms which can be summarized as follows: (i) Dutch 
disease, (ii) learning-by-doing, (iii) institutions, (iv) 
constitutional arrangement, (v) corruption, (vi) volatility, (vii) 
rent seeking, and (viii) unsustainable public policies. Most of 
them overlap with the channels discussed above, but the role of 
institutions is somewhat unique. Strong empirical evidence 
supports that good institutional quality can turn the curse into a 
blessing. The possibility of transforming the adverse effects of 
resource abundance does not associate to any other channel. 
Hence, the institutional approach may resolve the monotony 
problem and explain outliers like Norway. (Larsen 2006) 
Theories of political economy offer several methods to 
demonstrate how institutions affect resource-driven economies. 
Bulte and co-authors showed that not just economic growth, but 
many other measures of human development are conditional on 
the institutional quality. (Bulte et al. 2005) 
4 Political economy of the curse 
Some early studies already recognized that differences in 
governmental economic policies are more pronounced in case 
of resource abundance. (Auty 1997, 1998b) The state-centered 
explanations of the curse argue that abundant countries are 
likely to develop into rentier states (Ross 1999), where 
politicians engage in rent-seeking and patronage which induce 
poor economic governance, investment misallocation, and 
ineffective public employment. In this framework the adverse 
growth effects are conditional on the institutional quality of the 
public sector. (Kolstad 2009) 
Robinson and co-authors developed a formal two-period 
model of clientelism which features an election at the end of the 
first period with a politician wishing to be re-elected, an 
alternative candidate, and a unit mass of voters. (Robinson et al. 
2006, 2014) The public institutional quality is captured through 
the ability of the incumbent to affect the elections by hiring 
ineffective public employees. Put differently, it means that 
under weak institutions the incumbent can buy votes for wages. 
The model was designed to demonstrate the key results of the 
centralized theories of political economy. Firstly, politicians 
tend to over-extract natural resources relative to the socially 
optimal path, because they discount the future with the 
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Fig. 3: Natural resources and education 
Data source: The World Bank, available at: http://data.worldbank.org/ Fig. 3 Natural resources and education
Data source: The World Bank, available at: http://data.worldbank.org/
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supporting evidence for the taxation effect. (Ross, 2001) 
The negative feedback on the institutional quality causes 
resource-dependency and locks the country into a staple 
trap. In this case the long-run economic and political 
development is likely to be conditional on external agents 
(Auty, 2004), which appreciates the role of international 
institutions. (Keenan, 2014)
Political economy explanations describe a variety of 
cross-country growth experiences and seem to resolve 
the monotony-problem. All other transmission channels 
are conditional on the quality of institutions which in turn 
may be endogenous to natural wealth. Most measures of 
institutional environment – corruption, rule of law (see 
Table 1), accountability, government effectiveness – are 
proved to be significant in terms of economic growth and 
human development. (El Anshasy and Katsaiti, 2013) 
However, a considerable minority of the researchers found 
contradictory results.
5 Open questions
The first and most important ongoing debate concerns the 
resource curse phenomenon itself. Alexeev and Conrad 
(2011) examined the relationship between point-source re-
source abundance and economic growth, quality of insti-
tutions, investments in physical and human capital, and 
measures of social progress like infant mortality and life 
expectancy as well. They found no significant evidence 
for the adverse effects and concluded that the resource 
curse simply does not exist. Stijns (2005; 2006) argues 
that resource abundance is not a structural determinant of 
growth, but he recognizes both the positive and negative 
intermediate transmission channels. He also found a pos-
itive link from resource rents to human capital accumula-
tion, particularly in case of subsoil minerals. Moreover, 
Brunnschweiler (2008) reported empirical evidence on 
the positive direct growth effects of resource abundance. 
Together with Bulte, they designated the resource curse as 
a red herring since they found that (i) resource abundance 
and institutions determine resource dependence, but (ii) 
resource dependence does not affect economic growth, 
whereas (iii) resource abundance has positive impacts 
on growth and institutional quality. (Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte, 2008) Smith (2015) confirmed the positive effects in 
case of developing countries but he claims the institution-
al and other indirect channels to be less significant. Using 
the structural breakpoint methodology Mehrara (2009) re-
vealed a threshold effect, that is, natural resources hinder 
economic growth only if the share of rents are big enough 
compared to the size of the economy. He found that the re-
source curse appears when the sum of rents exceeds 18% 
of the production and claims that growth impacts are pos-
itive below the threshold. However, evidences supporting 
the curse on the level of the broad concept still outnumber 
the contradictory findings.
The second substantial question concerns the indices of 
natural wealth. Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010; 2016) 
argue that using resource intensity as an explanatory vari-
able suffers from endogeneity issues and measures the de-
pendency on resources instead of the abundance from the 
same. They found no evidence of adverse growth effects 
if natural wealth is estimated with the not yet extracted re-
serves per capita. Norman (2009) and Daniele (2011) also 
emphasise the distinction of dependence (flows) and abun-
dance (stocks) as they suggest that the resource curse theo-
ry is corresponsive with the former, but not with the latter. 
Essentially, all indices measuring natural wealth propor-
tional to current or past economic activities are likely to be 
fraught with endogeneity.
Another significant debate has evolved regarding not the 
economic but the political outcomes of different resource 
endowments. An interesting finding is that resource abun-
dance makes the incumbent regime more durable in auto-
cratic polities (Wantchekon, 2002; Smith, 2004; Andersen 
and Aslaksen, 2013) and increases the likelihood of inter-
national conflicts. (Colgan, 2014) On the contrary, Haber 
and Menaldo (2011) found no evidence for a negative re-
lation between resources and democracy on the long run. 
However, more recent studies seem to disprove their results. 
(Andersen and Ross 2014; Wiens et al., 2014) This contra-
diction may be resolved as Wright and others argue that the 
longer autocratic political survival stems not from the ability 
of resource regimes to withstand the pressure for democra-
tization, but from their ability to protect themselves against 
seizures of power by other autocratic groups. (Wright et al., 
2015) Moreover, Aytaç and co-authors state that – just like 
the economic impacts – the political curse is also condition-
al on the institutional quality. (Aytaç et al., 2016)
Rather than focusing on the macroeconomic out-
come, an interesting research trend concerns the effects 
of extraction on the scale of regions and local communi-
ties. (James and Aadland 2011; Aragón and Rud 2013a; 
Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis, 2015) If the resource curse 
holds for the micro and macro level as well, then meso lev-
el communities suffer double damage from both the poor 
performance of the national economy and the degradation 
of local social and environmental capital. Labelled as the 
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anthropology of the resource curse, research agenda aims 
to recontextualize the process of extraction in its social 
embedment and emphasises the significance of corporate 
responsibility. (Gilberthorpe and Rajak, 2016)
Despite the thriving literature on curse, there are still 
serious controversies to be solved. Future research should 
be more focused on the measures of resource endowment 
to address the endogeneity problem and distinguish be-
tween abundance and dependency. Further empirical evi-
dences are also required in order to identify the conditions 
on the evolution of the curse and get a better understand-
ing of its transmission channels. These future findings are 
prerequisites for the elaboration of more effective poli-
cies on resource extraction, revenue management, and 
sustainability.
6 Concluding remarks
“The Stone Age did not end for lack of stone, and the Oil 
Age will end long before the World runs out of oil.”
– Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani
Venezuela controls over the largest proven oil reserve 
and yet today the country is a scarce economy devastated 
by hyperinflation. On the other hand, Norway has the high-
est rank in the World according to the human development 
index. Explaining the fundamentally different growth 
experiences of resource abundant economies within the 
framework of a coherent concept turned out to be a hard 
case. However, more than two decades of intense research 
has made a significant progress. Strong theoretical and em-
pirical evidences support that the resource curse exists, but 
the adverse effects seem to be conditional on the econom-
ic and social norms of the country where the extraction 
takes place. The institutional environment interacts with 
resource endowment and the outcome depends on both the 
physical properties of the resource and the quality of insti-
tutions. Windfalls gave rise to rentier populism and caused 
several growth collapses in Venezuela (Mazzuca, 2013), 
whereas Norway remained a stable democracy. The latter 
demonstrates that strong institutions lead to sound revenue 
management policies (Mehrara, 2008; Holden, 2013) which 
promote diversification and help to prevent the Dutch dis-
ease. (Ville and Wicken, 2013)
Turning natural wealth into a blessing seems to be a 
question of public and private institutions alike. Common 
policy recommendations focus on the fundamentals of so-
cial development like equal access to land, primary educa-
tion, or healthcare. More specific suggestions concern the 
governance of extraction and emphasise the role of trans-
parency and accountability. The Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) is an international policy 
intervention which aims to mitigate the negative effects of 
resource abundance by promoting public awareness about 
the revenue management. Results so far are ambivalent 
(Williams, 2011; Mejía Acosta, 2013) as EITI succeed-
ed to soothe the negative growth effects (Corrigan, 2014) 
but failed to reduce corruption. Transparency seems to 
be insufficient in itself (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009a) which 
inspired more radical policy proposals. Adverse effects 
may be neutralized either by distributing the revenues 
directly to the public (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 
2013) or aspiring for domestic private ownership over the 
reserves. (Weinthal and Luong, 2006) However, the em-
phasis on institutional quality largely ignores under what 
conditions institutions are formed and changed. (Stevens 
and Dietsche, 2008)
The concept of impartially enhancing institutions inter-
prets institutional development as a form of an equilibri-
um outcome. It claims that moderate policy initiatives are 
likely to fail since the underlying dynamics of the socially 
embedded institutional change pull back the system to the 
bad equilibrium. (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009b) This effect 
may break down all internal efforts and puts the problem 
on the international level. Wenar (2008) argues that com-
modity export revenues are simply stolen from the citizens 
of resource abundant countries by their tyrants. Hence, 
multinational corporations are dealing with stolen prod-
ucts and this activity needs to be restricted. May it be a bit 
ironic, but it seems that only resource-deficient countries 
have the potential to exorcise the curse.
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